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Abstract: Starting from theories of secularization and of religious
individualization, we propose a two-dimensional typology of religiosity and
test its impact on political attitudes. Unlike classic conceptions of religiosity
used in political studies, our typology simultaneously accounts for an
individual’s sense of belonging to the church (institutional dimension) and
his/her personal religious beliefs (spiritual dimension). Our analysis, based on
data from the World Values Survey in Switzerland (1989–2007), shows two
main results. First, next to evidence of religious decline, we also find evidence
of religious change with an increase in the number of people who “believe
without belonging.” Second, non-religious individuals and individuals who
believe without belonging are significantly more permissive on issues of
cultural liberalism than followers of institutionalized forms of religiosity.
Throughout Western Europe, there is ample evidence of dramatic changes
in the religious landscape in the recent decades. Despite variations across
countries, the overall trend shows a steady decline in citizens’ degree of
religious practices since the 1960s (e.g., Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere
1995; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Voye´ 1999). Switzerland is no excep-
tion in this respect. From the early 1960s to the end of the 1990s, the
number of non-practicing Christians has evolved from a little over a
quarter of the population to almost half of the individuals (Campiche
et al. 1992, 74; Campiche 2004, 42). Affiliation to the official churches
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has also been decreasing as the proportion of people without any religious
confession has grown from 1.1% in 1970 to 11% of the population in
2000 (Bovay 2004, 11).
These trends show a substantial decline in institutionalized religion,
which refers to people’s sense of belonging to the church as an insti-
tution. They are in line with secularization theory that posits a decline
of the social relevance of religion (e.g., Berger 1967; Bruce 2002;
Martin 1978; Wilson 1982). However, there are also signs that point to
a change in religion. Proponents of the religious individualization
thesis (e.g., Hervieu-Le´ger 1999; Luckmann 1967) argue that a decline
in religious practices is not necessarily synonymous with a decline in reli-
gious beliefs. According to this perspective, traditional Christian religios-
ity centered on the church is making way for more privatized and
individualized forms of religiosity that develop outside of the authority
of religious institutions (e.g., Davie 1994; Hervieu-Le´ger 2003).
Indeed, the empirical evidence regarding the spiritual dimension of reli-
gion, which focuses on what individuals believe, reveals an increase over
the last decades in the proportion of people expressing spiritual concerns
(Norris and Inglehart 2004, 74–75).
Recent studies of religiosity in Switzerland tend to corroborate the
trend toward a privatization and individualization of religious beliefs.
The decade between 1989 and 1999 has seen a drastic increase in the
number of “inclusive Christians,” who combine the Christian doctrine
with beliefs borrowed from other religious traditions, and of “non-
Christian believers” who reject the tenets of the Christian faith but do
believe in a transcendent force (Campiche 2004, 115–121).1
In sum, it appears that the religious landscape of Western Europe is experi-
encing a double transformation since the late 1960s. On the one hand, indi-
viduals’ sense of belonging to the church is declining; on the other hand, the
spiritual dimension of religion is changing with the rise of so-called
“unchurched” or post-traditional forms of religiosity (Davie 2000, 2002).
The rare studies of the influence of religion on political attitudes have
only very partially accounted for the transformation of the religious land-
scape in Western Europe. A classic typology of religiosity typically com-
bines an indicator of people’s church attendance with their church
affiliation (e.g., Geissbu¨hler 1999). Such indicators might prove satisfac-
tory to capture the institutional dimension of religion. However, they
leave out its spiritual dimension by failing to measure whether and
what respondents believe. As long as the official churches dominated
the religious landscape, one could assume a certain degree of
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homogeneity in people’s religious beliefs, and a fair amount of congru-
ence between their sense of belonging to the church and their
beliefs. However, with the growth of post-traditional forms of religiosity,
religiosity is likely to differ across individuals not only with respect to
varying levels of religious practices but also with respect to a diversity
of beliefs.
In this article, we develop a more complete and accurate categorization
of religiosity that accounts for both dimensions of religiosity, that is
belonging (institutionalized religion), and believing (spirituality).
Combining two indicators of people’s religious belonging and two indi-
cators of their personal beliefs, we propose a two-dimensional typology
of religiosity.2 This typology captures both the traditional forms of reli-
giosity that are characterized by a strong sense of belonging to the estab-
lished churches and the post-traditional forms that are marked by more
individualized beliefs.
Based on this typology, we study whether and how different categories
of religiosity affect individuals’ political attitudes on the two main lines
of division structuring the Swiss political space, which is the cultural
“libertarian versus authoritarian” division and the economic “free
market versus state intervention” division (e.g., Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi
et al. 2006).
This article is structured as follows. The next section presents in some
more details the main transformations of the religious landscape in the
last decades. Then, we introduce our typology of religiosity and highlight
its implications for political attitudes on the economic and cultural lines
of conflict. The data used to operationalize the typology, and to test the
research hypotheses are presented thereafter. Next, we offer empirical
evidence on the scope of changes in religiosity in Switzerland, and
examine to which extent political attitudes differ in relationship to religi-
osity. The last section synthesizes our main findings and discusses the
importance of a two-dimensional typology of religiosity.
AN EVOLVING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE:
DECLINE AND CHANGE
There is a widespread agreement among theologians, sociologists of reli-
gion, and historians that the religious landscape of Western Europe has
experienced tremendous changes in the last decades. While there
appears to be a consensus regarding the decline in institutionalized
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religion, the evolution of religious beliefs across time is hotly contested.
This dispute finds its expression in an on-going and intense debate
between proponents of secularization theory (e.g., Berger 1967; Bruce
2002; Martin 1978) and advocates of the religious individualization
thesis (e.g., Hervieu-Le´ger 1999; Luckmann 1967).3
In the perspective of secularization theory, the process of moderniz-
ation is negatively correlated with the vitality of religion (Pollack and
Pickel 2007, 604). Modernization results in a growing rationalization of
the different domains of society that develop increasingly according to
their own logic and are more and more distinct from each other (Stolz
2007, 10). Thus, secularization consists of a process in which “religion
gradually loses the encompassing and important role which it had in tra-
ditional society” (Halman and Draulans 2006, 265). As a consequence,
the importance of religion for the operation of non-religious institutions
such as those of the state and the economy weakens. At the individual
level, secularization is manifested in “. . . a decline in the extent to
which people engage in religious practices, display beliefs of a religious
kind, and conduct other aspects of their lives in a manner informed by
such beliefs” (Bruce 2002, 3). In sum, secularization theory predicts a
decline in the importance of religious practices and beliefs as a conse-
quence of modernization.
Proponents of the religious individualization thesis (e.g., Hervieu-
Le´ger 1999; Luckmann 1967), on the other hand, make a clear distinction
between “church” and “religion” (Pollack and Pickel 2007, 604). In their
perspective, and in line with secularization theory, modernization is
expected to negatively affect traditional churches and church-related
behaviors. However, this decline in institutionalized religion does not
mean that individuals are becoming less religious. On the contrary, one
is likely to witness a rise in individual religiosity (Pollack and Pickel
2007, 604).
The individualization thesis goes back to Luckmann’s (1967) work on
the emergence of “invisible religion.” According to Luckmann (1967;
2003), as a consequence of modernization, the church has lost its mon-
opoly on the production of world-views. Individuals are thus confronted
with a plurality of world-views from which they can build their own
private system of beliefs in an autonomous fashion. Traditional
Christian beliefs shaped by the authority of the church give way to
“more “invisible” and “privatized” forms of religion that are character-
ized by an emphasis on self-expression, self-actualization, and individual
freedom” (Houtman and Mascini 2002, 458).
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These so-called post-traditional forms of religiosity can be of two
kinds. First, they can develop inside of the Christian faith but outside
of the churches leading to believing without belonging (Davie 1994,
2002; Hervieu-Le´ger 1999). In this perspective, “as the institutional dis-
ciplines decline, belief not only persists, but becomes increasingly per-
sonal, detached and heterogeneous” (Davie 2002, 8). Second, they can
take the form of alternative types of religion or “spirituality” outside of
the Christian realm. What we will refer to as post-Christian spirituality
has emerged in the counter-culture of the 1960s and has become a
central element of the “New Age” movement of the 1980s (Houtman
and Aupers 2007, 306). Despite their fragmented and heterogeneous
character, post-Christian spiritualities share a common dogma of “self
spirituality”: significance and identity are not given by “authoritative
sources, located outside of the self (e.g., the answers offered by
science and the Christian churches)” but by “an “internal” source,
located in the self’s deeper layers” (Houtman and Aupers 2007, 307;
Heelas 1996; Heelas and Woodhead 2005).
The differential evolution of religious practices and religious beliefs
pleads for a dual conception of religiosity that accounts for both its insti-
tutional and spiritual dimensions.
HOW TO MEASURE RELIGIOSITY: A TWO-DIMENSIONAL
TYPOLOGY
While a dual conception of religiosity is quite common in the sociology
of religion (e.g., Halman and Draulans 2006; Glendinning and Bruce
2006), research on the influence of religion on political behavior
usually relies on a uni-dimensional typology that only measures
people’s attachment to institutionalized religion. Research on Swiss pol-
itical behavior constitutes no exception in this respect. Findings on the
political influence of religiosity are clearly in line with theories of secu-
larization and stress the declining relevance of religion for political
preferences. While historically religion has played a central role in
Switzerland by shaping the Swiss party system along confessional div-
isions among cantons (e.g., Klo¨ti 1998; Kriesi 1998), its effect on
party choice has constantly declined since the 1970s, and is quite weak
in the most recent elections, except for the vote for the Christian-
Democratic Party (e.g., Hug and Trechsel 2002; Lachat 2007; Nabholz
1998; Trechsel 1995). The few studies on the influence of religion on
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political attitudes confirm the attenuation of confessional differences and
point to a possible replacement of the confessional cleavage by a clea-
vage in religious practice (Geissbu¨hler 1999).
To capture both religious decline and religious change, we propose a
more encompassing typology of religiosity that combines both dimen-
sions of religiosity that is belonging (institutionalized religion) and
believing (spirituality).
The institutional dimension of religion focuses on individuals’ sense of
belonging to the church, and comprises two main facets. We are first
interested in the extent to which people are involved in the church,
meaning that they attend services, participate in the activities of the
church, and consider themselves a member of the community. In addition
to these “objective” signs of belonging, people’s attachment to the church
(or remoteness from it) can also be expressed by less visible means: the
second aspect of the institutional dimension focuses thus on people’s sub-
jective assessment of established churches, that is, on their (positive or
negative) opinions about them, on their level of confidence in them, or
in their degree of satisfaction with them. Contrarily to what is usually
done in classic typologies of religiosity, we do not include church affilia-
tion in our conceptualization of institutional religion. Based on existing
empirical evidence, it is doubtful that church affiliation still reflects
people’s sense of belonging to a church, at least not in the
Swiss context, where constantly high levels of religious affiliation
(Bovay 2004) tend to be a reflection of traditions or social convenience
rather than a real connection to one of the official churches (Campiche
2004, 38).
On this basis, one can differentiate between three types of relationships
to the church as an institution (see Table 1). Individuals who are regularly
involved in the established churches are considered belongers, irrespec-
tive of their subjective assessment of the church; given that regular
church involvement requires a strong commitment from people, we
assume that these individuals still display a solid relationship to the insti-
tutionalized church, even though they might not have a positive assess-
ment of the churches in general. The second type consists of
individuals who are more ambivalent toward the church in the sense
that they are not regularly involved but do not overtly reject the church
(they do not have a negative assessment of the institution). Finally, a
third type comprises people who have taken their distance from
the church as an institution both objectively by not being involved and
subjectively by having a negative judgment.
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The spiritual dimension of religiosity focuses on individuals’ personal
religious beliefs. In this perspective, we draw two main distinctions. The
first distinction deals with people’s relationship to the spiritual sphere:
we are interested in assessing to which extent people express spiritual
or religious beliefs in transcendence, irrespective of the type of transcen-
dence (a godly power, supernatural energies, or any kind of superior
force). Given our focus on Christianity, the second aspect of the spiritual
dimension directly focuses on individuals’ relationship to the Christian
faith: in this case, our typology draws a distinction between people
who share the main tenets of the Christian faith (belief in the God of
Jesus Christ, and in the Bible) and the ones who do not, no matter
whether they express other types of religious beliefs or not.
We distinguish among three types of beliefs (see Table 1). The first
type of beliefs is characterized by its Christian obedience; what is deter-
minant here is people’s belief in the Christian tenets, irrespective whether
they additionally express spiritual concerns or not. The second type is
summarized under the generic term spiritual and includes individuals
Table 1. Typology of religiosity based on the institutional (belonging) and
spiritual dimensions (believing) of religiosity
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who express religious or spiritual beliefs that are not of Christian inspi-
ration. Finally, the last type is defined as atheist and groups people
who do not express any religious or spiritual beliefs.
Of course, these distinctions are much too crude to accurately reflect the
current diversity and richness of individuals’ personal beliefs. On this
basis, we can only distinguish among individuals who hold Christian
beliefs, those who hold other types of religious beliefs, and those who do
not hold beliefs of any kind. In particular, we do not adequately capture
the various forms of post-Christian spiritualities that cover a very hetero-
geneous set of beliefs such as holism, esotericism, or New Age, to only
mention a few examples. The choice of this simple categorization is
however motivated first by a practical concern about the operationalization
of our typology; indeed, most political surveys only include a very limited
set of indicators of individuals’ religious beliefs that do not permit to go
further in the measure of the spiritual dimension. Second, from a theoretical
viewpoint, we expect the distinction between Christian beliefs and other
types of beliefs to be more relevant to the understanding of political
attitudes than a more subtle differentiation among various types of
post-Christian spirituality (see next section).
The combination of the different types of “belonging” and “believing” can
be clustered into six groups. The first three groups belong to the traditional
forms of religiosity that develop either within the official Christian churches
(for the practicing Christians and the belongers without believing) or at least
not in opposition to them (for the uncommitted Christians).
The first group consists of practicing Christians, namely individuals
who “belong” on the institutional dimension, and are of Christian obedi-
ence on the spiritual dimension. There is however one exception to this cat-
egorization: individuals who are regularly involved in the church, have
Christian beliefs but have a negative assessment of the church, and do
not express spiritual concerns, are not considered practicing Christians,
although they are “belongers” and have Christian beliefs. Given that they
are ambivalent regarding both their sense of belonging and their beliefs,
we think that it is more accurate to categorize them as uncommitted
Christians (see next category).
Second, so-called uncommitted Christians are characterized by their
Christian beliefs and their ambivalence on the institutional dimension;
they have a weaker sense of belonging than the previous category since
they are not regularly involved in the church, but they still have a positive
assessment of the churches, contrarily to the individuals who believe but
do not belong (see below).
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The last group in the traditional forms of religiosity includes individ-
uals who belong but do not believe. People in this group are characterized
by a strong sense of belonging on the institutional dimension (regular
church involvement) but they do not believe in the Christian tenets,
either because they hold other types of religious beliefs (for the spiritual
type) or because they are non-religious (for the atheist type). This group
is likely to consist of people who remain close to the church by tradition
or social conformity but without sharing the religious beliefs that usually
go with the sense of belonging.
These traditional forms of religiosity stand in contrast to what we call
post-traditional forms of religiosity that are characterized by their rejec-
tion of the authority of institutionalized churches. We differentiate
between two groups of post-traditional believers. First, believers
without belonging display beliefs of Christian inspiration but their faith
develops outside of the institutionalized churches from which they have
taken their distance. For this category, Christian beliefs and the
absence of a sense of institutional belonging constitute the key features.
The second group consists of individuals who manifest the same dis-
tance with regard to the official churches as believers without belonging
but who express spiritual beliefs that are not of Christian inspiration.
Since we do not go further in the exploration of the types of beliefs
held by these individuals, we refer to this group by the generic label
post-Christians. We also include in this category people who express
spiritual beliefs that are not Christian, but are ambivalent with respect
to their sense of institutional belonging, since they are not involved in
the church but still have a positive assessment of it.4
Non-religious people constitute our last group. Individuals in this
group are characterized by their ambivalence or distance from the
church on the institutional dimension and their absence of any kind of
religious beliefs. Absences of religious beliefs and of church involvement
are the decisive features for fitting in this group so that both individuals
who have a positive or a negative assessment of the church fall into this
category.
This two-dimensional typology allows for a more nuanced categoriz-
ation of religiosity than a classic typology accounting only for the insti-
tutional dimension of religion. In fact, the lack of inclusion of religious
beliefs leads to group in a single category individual with very different
forms of religiosity. Based on a classic typology, a non-practicing
Christian might be, as common wisdom would suggest, an individual
who believes in the main tenets of the Christian faith but only goes to
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church on specific occasions such as weddings, funerals or, important cel-
ebrations. However, a post-Christian, a believer without belonging, or
even a non-religious person would fall in the same category as long as
they did not bother to get rid of their church affiliation. In other words,
the mere focus on church affiliation and church attendance no longer
accurately reflects the current richness and diversity of forms of
religiosity.
FORMS OF RELIGIOSITY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES
Having proposed a two-dimensional typology of religiosity, we now turn
to the question of the influence of these various forms of religiosity on
political attitudes. As shown by different authors (Kitschelt 1994;
Kriesi et al. 2006), the political landscape in Western European countries
is structured along two main dimensions of political values. The first
dimension consists of the classic economic opposition between free
market economy (capitalism) and state interventionism (socialism). The
second dimension of conflict is cultural and opposes defenders of liber-
tarian values emphasizing individual freedom to proponents of authori-
tarian values stressing social compliance (e.g., Kitschelt 1994).
Differences in religiosity are assumed to have little influence on indi-
viduals’ attitudes on the economic axis. Both theorists of secularization
and proponents of religious individualization agree that modernization
has resulted in a growing differentiation and autonomization of the differ-
ent domains of society, resulting in the loss of religion’s overarching and
dominant character (e.g., Bruce 2002; Luckmann 1967). In particular, the
functioning of the state and the economy has been gradually freed from
the influence of religious institutions (Bruce 2002, 3). In addition, accord-
ing to a recent study by Campiche (2004, 198), a majority of the popu-
lation and especially the economic circles consider that the churches
are not competent in the economic sphere. Thus, we assume that there
will be no significant relationship between citizens’ religiosity and their
preferences for an economic system ruled by the laws of the market or
by state intervention.
Our expectations are more nuanced with regard to attitudes on the cul-
tural axis of conflict between libertarian and authoritarian values.
Following Bornschier (forthcoming), we differentiate among three
dimensions of the cultural divide, namely attitudes towards cultural liber-
alism, cultural diversity, and opening up of the country. The last two sets
Changing Religiosity, Changing Politics? 85
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048309000042
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:50:38, subject to the Cambridge Core
of attitudes are expected to be relatively immune from the influence of
religiosity, given that these issues lie largely outside of the current
sphere of influence of the church. The cultural liberalism dimension for
its part taps issues related to morality and ethics that have been tradition-
ally addressed by the church; as a consequence, people’s preferences on
this dimension are more likely to vary depending on the different types of
religiosity.
More specifically, we expect differences in the degree of cultural lib-
eralism to be primarily driven by individuals’ sense of belonging to the
church, and secondarily by the types of beliefs they hold. With respect
to the “belonging” dimension, one can differentiate between traditional
forms of religiosity that are characterized by their acceptance — or at
least the absence of rejection — of the authority of established churches,
and post-traditional forms of religiosity that have developed outside and
are distanced from religious institutions. We believe this difference in
attitudes toward religious institutions to be relevant for explaining indi-
viduals’ preferences on the cultural liberalism axis. Post-traditional
believers (believers without belonging, post-Christians) stress the import-
ance of individual freedom, of independence from religious institutions,
of the development of their own belief systems unconstrained by the auth-
ority of established churches (Luckmann 1967; Heelas and Woodhead
2005). This emphasis on liberty and autonomy is expected to be reflected
in a preference for libertarian values that favor “creative self-fulfillment”
and “self-determination” (Kitschelt 1994, 17). By contrast, traditional
believers (practicing Christians, uncommitted Christians, belongers
without believing) are likely to be more influenced by the authority of
the churches, a trait that is susceptible to foster “compliance with estab-
lished norms and practices” (Kitschelt 1994, 29). As a consequence, they
are expected to adopt more authoritarian values that “favor social compli-
ance” and “standards of social rectitude adopted upon the command of a
higher authority” (Kitschelt 1994, 17).
In addition, we also expect differences in attitudes according to the
spiritual dimension of religious beliefs. Among traditional believers,
this preference for more authoritarian values is likely to be especially
marked for practicing Christians who have the closest connection with
the institutionalized churches both with respect to their degree of belong-
ing (that is greater than the ones of uncommitted Christians) and with
respect to their beliefs (that are coherent with their institutional attach-
ment contrarily to the ones of people who belong without believing).
Among post-traditional believers, we expect post-Christians to be more
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culturally liberal than believers who don’t belong. Although both are
characterized by their remoteness from institutionalized churches, indi-
viduals who believe without belonging are still of Christian obedience
and are, as such, likely to be more influenced by the messages from
the church than post-Christians who have taken their distance both
from the church as an institution and from the Christian doctrine.
Finally, the greatest degree of cultural liberalism is expected from non-
religious individuals whose convictions are independent from the auth-
ority of the church and immune to the influence of religious messages.
DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATION
In order to study the evolving religious landscape and its implications for
political attitudes, we use data from the 1989, 1996, and 2007 waves of
the World Value Survey (WVS) in Switzerland. As emphasized before,
our main variable of interest, religiosity consists of an institutional and
a spiritual dimension (see Table 1). The institutional dimension of reli-
gious belonging is fairly well captured by the questions asked in the
WVS. Its first aspect, church involvement, is measured by frequency
of church attendance, religious practice constituting a noticeable sign
of people’s objective involvement in the church. Individuals who go to
church at least once a month are coded 1, while the others are coded 0.
The second aspect, people’s subjective assessment of the church, is
measured by their degree of confidence in the churches, which allows
us to differentiate between people who trust the church as an institution,
and individuals who have taken their distance from it. Individuals who
have a lot or quite a lot of confidence are coded 1, others are coded 0.
The spiritual dimension of religious believing is much more difficult to
measure. Like most surveys that are not explicitly focused on religiosity,
the WVS contains no questions that directly ask people about their belief
in a Christian God or in various forms of post-Christian spiritualities.5
Despite these limitations, we think that the available indicators allow
for a satisfactory, albeit crude instrument to discriminate between
Christian and other forms of religious beliefs (for a similar approach
using WVS, see also Houtman and Aupers 2007, 310). The first aspect
of the believing dimension, that is, people’s relationship to the spiritual
sphere, is measured by an individual’s self-assessment of his/her own
religiosity. Individuals who consider themselves religious are coded 1,
while the others are coded 0. Unfortunately, this question only deals
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with religious beliefs and does not allow us to single out individuals who
describe themselves as spiritual. People’s relationship to the Christian
faith, the second aspect of believing, is measured by a question asking
people about the importance of God in their personal life,6 individuals
answering that God is important or quite important in their lives are
coded 1, the others are coded 0.
In order to study the political significance of different types of religios-
ity, we analyze how they relate to political attitudes along the two main axes
of political competition in Switzerland. The economic conflict line is
measured by two dimensions resulting from a factor analysis that we per-
formed on five economic indicators available in the WVS. The first dimen-
sion refers to economic liberalism and is captured by three questions asking
respondents whether more firms should be privatized, whether government
should take more responsibility for citizens, and whether competition is
good or harmful. The second dimension pertains to income equality and
is based on two questions asking whether incomes should be made more
equal, and whether income differences should persist as an incentive for
economic prosperity. All variables have been recoded in order to attribute
higher values to traditional preferences of the political right and lower
values to classic positions of the political left.
The cultural dimension consists of three dimensions (Bornschier forth-
coming): cultural liberalism, cultural diversity, and opening up of the
country. The first dimension is tapped by a battery of questions asking
respondents whether homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, divorce,
euthanasia, and suicide are justifiable behaviors or not. The cultural
diversity element is measured by three items asking whether employers
should give priority to Swiss people if jobs are scarce, whether
Switzerland should provide equal chances for immigrants or better
chances for Swiss people, and which immigration policy is preferred
by respondents. The last dimension, opening up of the country, is
based on two items measuring confidence in the European Union and
the United Nations, and a more general question asking whether
Switzerland should open itself to the outside or whether it should pre-
serve its traditions. The results of a factor analysis confirming the cluster-
ing in three dimensions are used to measure each separate dimension.
In addition, we control for the effect of a number of classic control
variables (gender, age, education, income, and urbanity). Furthermore,
in line with other studies of the influence of religion on political prefer-
ences (Geissbu¨hler 1999), we control for possible differences in attitudes
between Catholics and Protestants.
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For lack of data on almost all indicators of the economic and cultural con-
flict lines in the first wave of the WVS, our analysis of the impact of differ-
ent forms of religiosity on political attitudes is restricted to the 2007 wave.
EVOLUTION OF THE RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE
We first study the evolution of religious practices and beliefs in
Switzerland during the past 20 years. Table 2 shows a strong decline in
the institutional dimension of religion.
Both indicators of belonging show that the Swiss increasingly free them-
selves from official forms of religion and established religious authorities.
With respect to their degree of involvement in the churches, it appears that
the number of regular churchgoers has sharply declined over the years. In
2007, less than a quarter of the population attends religious services
more than once a month while most Swiss only go to church on special
occasions such as weddings, baptisms, or funerals. The declining rate of
participation in organized religion is accompanied by a loss of confidence
in the churches: in 2007, only 8% of the Swiss — less than half as many as
in 1989 — declare to fully trust them. Interestingly enough, this tremendous
weakening of institutionalized religion is especially pronounced among
Catholics. Whereas Catholics scored much higher on both indicators of reli-
gious belonging than Protestants at the end of the 1980s, differences
between the two denominations have since significantly decreased (as in
the case of church attendance) or even completely disappeared (as in the
case of confidence in the churches).
The waning importance of institutionalized religion lends some
support to theories of secularization, but does not necessarily mean
that the Swiss have become less religious. Table 3 shows how the spiri-
tual dimension of religiosity (believing) has evolved over the years.
Table 2. Evolution of institutionalized religion, 1989–2007 (in %, N within
parentheses)
1989 1996 2007 Change 89/07a
Goes to church more than
once a month
41.4 (509) 23.8 (275) 23.0 (245) 218.4***
Has a great deal of
confidence in churches
18.8 (246) 6.8 (75) 7.9 (83) 210.9***
Level of significance: ***p, 0.001, atwo-tailed Z-test.
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Parallel to the decline in institutionalized religion, Switzerland has also
witnessed a weakening of religious beliefs over the past 20 years. In fact,
we find a significant decrease, rather than an increase, in the self-assess-
ment of religiosity (from 73% in 1989 to 65% in 2007). The proportion
of individuals who declare themselves as religious remains however at
a relatively high level, especially in international comparison.7
Furthermore, people’s attachment to the Christian faith, measured by
the significance of God in their personal lives, remains constantly high
over the years. Most interestingly, among people without denomination,
the proportion of those who consider God very important in their personal
life has doubled over the years and reaches 21% in 2007. This result
underlines that “believing” and “belonging” do not necessarily evolve
in parallel. In contrast to the British case (Davie 1994), religious practices
and religious beliefs are both declining in Switzerland, but the latter
appear to be more resistant to change than the former. While we
witness a sharp decline in church attendance and people’s level of confi-
dence in the churches, religious beliefs are more stable and erode to a
lesser extent. As predicted by the religious individualization thesis,
many Swiss have kept their Christian faith — especially their belief in
God — but turned away from the official churches.
This differential evolution of religious beliefs and practices suggests
that forms of post-traditional religiosity and non-religiosity have gained
significance over time. Table 4 yields empirical evidence in this respect.
Indeed, traditional forms of religiosity have steadily declined from 1989 to
2007 in Switzerland and have given way to the rise of post-traditional religi-
osity and, especially, non-religiosity. Most noticeably, the proportion of
practicing Christians, who believe in the main tenets of the Christian faith,
and are strongly involved in the church, drastically decreases over time
(217.3%). Whereas practicing Christians were by far the single most import-
ant category of religiosity in 1989, they have by now been outnumbered by
Table 3. Evolution of religious beliefs, 1989–2007 (in %, N within
parentheses)
1989 1996 2007 Change 89/07a
A religious person 73.2 (922) 56.8 (627) 64.7 (672) 28.5**
God is very important
in personal life
31.9 (419) 24.0 (273) 28.7 (304) 23.2 n.s.
Levels of significance: n.s. not significant, **p, 0.01, atwo-tailed Z-test.
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non-religious people and individuals who “believe without belonging”.
While the spread of non-religiosity lends support to the secularization
theory and shows a parallel decline in the institutional and spiritual dimen-
sions of religion among growing segments of the population, the increasing
number of believers who do not belong points to religious change and a
growing importance of post-traditional forms of religiosity, as predicted by
the religious individualization thesis. In fact, the group of people who
believe without belonging has doubled since 1989 and represents almost a
quarter of the population in 2007. Hence, there is a significant and
growing part of the Swiss population who identifies with Christian beliefs
while questioning the relevance of institutionalized religion. In
Switzerland, religious change however does not seem to translate into
alternative forms of religion outside the Christian realm. Post-Christian spiri-
tuality appears to be a limited phenomenon in the Swiss case and there is no
evidence for a spread of this form of religiosity in recent years. If anything,
the number of post-Christian believers tends to decrease over the years (from
12.5% in 1989 to 8.5% in 2007). In the Swiss context, though, post-tra-
ditional forms of religiosity seem to mainly develop within the Christian
faith, although some caution is in order due to the lack of appropriate data
and poor measurement of post-Christian spirituality.
In sum, there is clear evidence of the changing religious landscape in
Switzerland: while the erosion of traditional Christians and the concomitant
rise of non-religious individuals are indicative of religious decline, the
growing importance of “believing without belonging” points to religious
change.
Table 4. Evolution of different forms of religiosity, 1989–2007 (in %)
1989 1996 2007 Change 89/07a
Traditional forms of religiosity
Practicing Christians 39.8 23.1 22.5 217.3***
Belonging without believing 1.2 0.6 0.5 20.7 n.s.
Uncommitted Christians 19.6 13.8 18.3 21.3 n.s.
Post-traditional forms of religiosity
Believing without belonging 11.0 23.8 22.9 þ11.9***
Post-Christian believers 12.5 8.5 8.5 24.0 n.s.
Non-religiosity
Non-religious individuals 15.9 30.3 27.2 þ11.3***
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
N 1057 1010 999
Levels of significance: n.s. not significant, ***p, 0.001. Cramer’s V: 0.181***, atwo-tailed Z-test.
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THE IMPACT OF RELIGIOSITY ON POLITICAL ATTITUDES
Having shown the evolution of religiosity in Switzerland since 1989, we
now turn to the consequences of the various forms of religiosity for pol-
itical attitudes on the two main conflict lines structuring the political
space in Switzerland (see table 5).8
The two first columns in Table 5 display the influence of religiosity on
the economic dimension of conflict captured here by preferences for
economic liberalism and income equality. In line with our expectations,
religion does not matter for political attitudes on the economic dimension
of the Swiss political space. Preferences for economic liberalism and
income equality are independent from the types of religiosity, and confes-
sion does not play a role either.
By contrast, our two-dimensional typology of religiosity unfolds its
full importance when it comes to attitudes on the cultural dimension of
the political space. In line with our expectations, religiosity has no
importance as far as cultural diversity and international openness is con-
cerned, but clearly matters for individuals’ preferences on cultural liber-
alism, that is questioned on which the established churches traditionally
have a strong influence. Indeed, followers of traditional forms of religios-
ity, especially practicing Christians, are less permissive on morality
issues than post-traditional believers and non-religious persons. In line
with other studies (Geissbu¨hler 1999), we can say that the religious clea-
vage is of lasting significance for some political attitudes. In addition, our
findings underline that the traditional distinction in studies of political
behavior between practicing and non-practicing individuals does not
tell the whole story and misses an important element of religiosity.
Although the sharpest differences in attitudes on morality issues
emerge between practicing Christians and non-religious individuals, we
also observe differences between uncommitted Christians and believers
who don’t belong. In other words, a simple dichotomy between practicing
and non-practicing people, which groups uncommitted Christians,
persons who believe without belonging and non-religious individuals in
a single category of non-practicing Christians, would have passed over
the differences in their moral attitudes. However, we show that moral per-
missiveness gradually increases as one moves from practicing Christians
to non-religious individuals.
As expected, differences in the degree of cultural liberalism are primar-
ily driven by an individual’s sense of religious belonging. Indeed, what
distinguishes post-traditional believers and non-religious individuals
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Table 5. Determinants of attitudes with regard to the economic and cultural conflict lines in the Swiss political space, 2007
(OLS regressions, unstandardized coefficients; data weighted according to the linguistic regions)
Economic divide Cultural divide
Economic liberalism Income equality Openness Cultural diversity Cultural liberalism
Type of religiosity n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. ***
Practicing Christians 20.136 20.163 20.194 20.056 20.532***
Believing without belonging 0.055 20.024 20.245* 20.213 0.293**
Post-Christians 20.226 20.189 20.016 20.222 0.013
Non-religious individuals 20.210 20.175 20.178 20.039 0.530***
Catholic 0.005 20.039 20.137 20.170* 20.237***
Male 0.181* 0.225** 20.188* 20.006 20.286***
Age ** n.s. n.s. ** ***
Age 18-24 20.617** 0.134 0.348 20.079 0.225
Age 25-34 20.401** 20.058 0.398* 0.061 0.325*
Age 35-44 20.195 20.285* 0.290* 0.207 0.450***
Age 45-54 20.503*** 20.226 0.087 0.254* 0.482***
Age 55-64 20.247* 20.232* 0.177 0.449*** 0.323**
Education n.s. n.s. *** *** **
Apprenticeship 0.133 20.175 20.128 0.445** 0.349**
High school 20.195 20.130 0.108 0.619** 0.355*
Higher vocational education 20.001 0.030 0.053 0.674*** 0.337*
Higher technical education 0.139 20.069 0.216 0.939*** 0.639***
University 20.005 20.022 0.422* 1.000*** 0.593***
Income 0.066*** 0.071*** 0.020 0.040** 0.023
Marital status n.s. *** n.s. n.s. n.s.
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Economic divide Cultural divide
Economic liberalism Income equality Openness Cultural diversity Cultural liberalism
Unmarried couple 20.245 20.782*** 0.164 20.190 0.097
Divorced 20.113 20.436** 0.278* 0.146 20.036
Widowed 20.070 20.255 0.381* 0.189 20.004
Urbanity n.s. n.s. n.s. ** n.s.
Big cities 20.090 20.180 0.110 0.126 0.114
Urban agglomerations 20.061 0.015 20.064 20.143 0.018
Constant 20.134 20.044 20.174 20.913*** 20.639**
R square 0.095 0.126 0.096 0.167 0.332
N 730 773 737 747 700
Levels of significance: ***p , 0.001, **p, 0.01, *p , 0.05.
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from uncommitted Christians is their distrust in the official churches.
Their emphasis on more privatized forms of religion or, in the case of
non-religious people, on complete independence from religious belief
systems and traditional precepts of the churches is apparently conducive
to the development of libertarian values, which stress self-fulfillment and
self-determination (Kitschelt 1994, 17).9
In addition, it is worth noting that church affiliation continues to play
an independent role for political attitudes on issues of cultural liberalism.
Not surprisingly, Catholics are less liberal on moral issues than
Protestants and people without a denomination. On questions of accepta-
ble moral behavior, the confessional cleavage thus continues to matter.
Wrapping up, we see that differences in forms of religiosity affect
people’s political attitudes on cultural liberalism. Especially the differ-
ences in the attitudes of various groups of non-practicing Christians
(uncommitted Christians, believers without belonging, non-religious
individuals) clearly underline the usefulness of a two-dimensional typo-
logy of religiosity, which categorizes people according to their degree of
belonging to the church and their religious beliefs.
DISCUSSION
This article has highlighted the double transformation of the religious
landscape that has taken place across Western European countries since
the 1960s. This evolution characterized by religious decline and religious
change highlights the dual nature of religiosity that consists of an insti-
tutional and a spiritual dimension that do not necessarily evolve simi-
larly; while the institutional dimension focuses on people’s degree of
attachment to the church (belonging), the spiritual dimension deals
with people’s religious beliefs (believing). The dual nature of religiosity
casts some doubts on the pertinence of classic typologies of religion that
are commonly used in studies of political behavior, and only focus on the
institutional dimension of religion. To overcome this shortcoming, we
have developed a more comprehensive typology of religiosity that differ-
entiates among individuals with respect both to their relationship to the
church (institutional dimension) and to their religious beliefs (spiritual
dimension). The use of a more subtle categorization of religiosity
permits us to highlight two main findings.
First, our typology sheds some light on the evolution of the Swiss
religious landscape over the almost 20 years covered by the WVS.
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These results show that it is misleading to reduce the evolution of religion
in Switzerland to mere secularization. In line with other studies
(Campiche 2004; Campiche et al. 1992), our findings show indeed a
trend toward secularization that is manifest in the decline in the
numbers of traditional Christians, and in the rise of non-religious individ-
uals. However, secularization is not the entire story. One also sees a sig-
nificant increase in the number of individuals who still believe but no
longer belong. This finding supports the idea of an evolution of
Christian religiosity toward unchurched religion (Davie 2000, 2002). In
other words, institutionalized religion appears to erode but this does
not mean that religiosity disappears. In Switzerland, the rise in more pri-
vatized forms of religiosity appears to be limited to the kinds that develop
within the Christian faith. Post-Christian forms of religiosity, in the wake
of New Age movements, have rather seen a decline in their followers over
the years. This result needs nevertheless to be taken with some caution,
given the crudeness of the available indicators.
Second, the use of a more subtle categorization of religiosity is not
without any relevance for the study of political attitudes. Differences in
forms of religiosity clearly affect citizens’ preferences on cultural liberal-
ism, one of the dimensions of the “libertarian-authoritarian” axis of politi-
cal conflict. With the exception of post-Christians, our findings support our
research hypothesis: individuals who believe without belonging as well as
non-religious people are significantly more permissive on issues related to
cultural liberalism than followers of institutionalized forms of religiosity.
These results underscore first the continuing relevance of religious prefer-
ences for the formation of selected political attitudes. Second, they point to
the importance of a more refined categorization of religiosity. Our typol-
ogy reveals significant differences among “uncommitted Christians,”
“believers without belonging,” and “non-religious individuals.” These
nuances are lost in a classic typology in which, based on their confession
and their religious practice, most of these individuals would be grouped in
the single category of “non-practicing Christians.”
In conclusion, this article constitutes a first attempt at drawing the con-
sequences of the transformation of religiosity for the study of political
behavior. As discussed above, the data at our disposal only allows for a
crude measure of religious beliefs. The presence of significant effects
of religiosity on political attitudes, in spite of the weaknesses in the oper-
ationalization of one of the central dimensions of our study, underlines
the importance of taking religious change seriously, at least as seriously
as religious decline.
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NOTES
1. In addition to the emergence of post-traditional forms of religiosity, one also witnesses an
increase in the number of followers of non-Christian religions. In Switzerland, this is especially
the case for Islamist communities who represented 0.3% in the 1970 population census and 4.3%
in the 2000 census (Bovay 2004, 11). In this study, however, we leave out individuals who belong
to other religious communities.
2. The use of two-dimensional typologies of religion is fairly common in the sociology of religion;
for recent examples of the use of such typologies, see, for instance, Halman and Draulans (2006) and
Glendinning and Bruce (2006). However, to our knowledge, such typologies have only been rarely
used in studies of political behavior.
3. The theory of religious markets (e.g., Finke and Iannaccone 1993; Stark and Bainbridge 1985)
constitutes the third main approach explaining the transformation of religion. This theory focuses on
the supply-side of religion, and on the degree of competition among religious institutions to explain
variations in the degree of religiosity across countries. It is however less relevant for an explanation of
the evolution of individual religious beliefs within a single country.
4. This categorization is explained by the fact that, among the six types of religiosity that we
differentiate, these individuals do not fit in any of the other types and are closest to the post-
Christian type.
5. The 1989 wave of the WVS in Switzerland contained a wide set of questions on people’s reli-
gious beliefs and practices. Unfortunately, these questions have only been asked in this wave and thus
cannot be used for a comparison across time.
6. Again, this indicator is rather crude since the question does not explicitly ask whether people
believe in God or not. Ideally, we would have preferred a more specific question such as the following
one: “Which of the following statements comes closest to your own beliefs: there is a personal God;
there is some sort of spirit or life force; I don’t really know what to think; I don’t really think there is
any sort of spirit, God, or life force.” However, this question is only available for the 1989 wave.
7. In Germany, for instance, this proportion amounts to 54% in West Germany and to 20% in East
Germany (Pollack and Pickel 2007, 616).
8. Given the limited number of people in the “belonging without believing” group, this category
has been dropped from the analysis.
9. Given that the questions on justifiable moral behavior were included in the 1989 wave of the
WVS, we were able to reproduce our analysis of the cultural liberalism dimension for this year.
Regression results closely correspond to the reported results for 2007.
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